Misreading The Muslim Mind-Set:
A Lesson U.S. Foreign Policymakers
By Fereydoun Hoveyda
(American Foreign Policy Interests, August 1999)
In April 1999 a number of Arab intellectuals and others met in Morocco to discuss human rights and democratic freedoms in their respective countries. In the final document issued at the end of their gathering, they stated that instead of progressing and expanding, the limited liberties that existed in almost all their countries had steadily declined. Curiously enough, the document included a paragraph unrelated to the subject matter It condemned Israel as a racist and imperialist state.1
History bears witness to the fact that since the late forties the United States has not spared any political and financial effort to help bring the parties together and to broker a peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Inside as well as outside the United Nations, American diplomats have worked untiringly to achieve this goal. Despite numerous UN resolutions, the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian treaty, the 1993 solemn White House handshake between Arafat and Rabin, the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, the Wye agreements in other words, despite America's continual efforts to advance the peace process - the prospects for a real and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians and other Arabs remain doubtful. Indeed the twenty-year-old Egyptian-Israeli treaty has not yielded the expected results. The situation between the two countries resembles a state of "no war" rather than real peace. The Israeli-Jordanian treaty is still in an experimental stage, prompting many people to complain that they have not yet collected any peace dividend. The peace process triggered by the Oslo declaration lags far behind schedule. Terrorist activities instigated locally and outside the area continue to hamper initiatives. Arab and other Muslim states such as Syria and Iran have reaffirmed their opposition to the peace process. Last but not least, popular sup-port for peace is rapidly eroding among the Muslim masses. Today in the Arab and Muslim world, the American flag continues to be burned or desecrated by angry demonstrators. Even some Israeli circles are concerned about America's understanding of their security concerns.
One can identify a host of "causes" to explain this situation. First and foremost, Arab nationalism, which was directed against British and French colonial rule and swept the Middle East after World War II, was fueled by the partition of Palestine and the creation of the state of Israel. Nationalism waned in the 1980s and was replaced by religious fundamentalist activism that peaked after Khomeini's seizure of power in Iran. The still unresolved refugee problem that erupted after the 1948 war between Israel and its neighbors con tines to breed hatred of Israel in particular and the Jews in general. The Arabs' humiliating defeat of 1967 and the occupation of their lands for more than thirty years as well as Israel's reluctance to implement all the articles of the Oslo declaration have exasperated the Arab and Muslim masses. Finally, as a result of the cold-war situation that lasted until the 1 990s, Russia supported Arab intransigence against Israel and the West, bolstering anti-Jewish feelings.
The Arab attitude toward the West reflects their inability to forget the 1956 British, French, and Israeli expedition against Egypt and Colonel Nasser, their hero. When they look at the United States, they see not evenhandedness, but one-sided support for Israel. It is true that the fickleness of American foreign policy during the past fifty years has not helped the United States gain popular support in the Muslim world. The 1953 CIA coup against Mossadegh, another "Muslim" hero, harmed the image of the United States in the region. Moreover, the support given to some Persian Gulf dictatorships, which are often hated by their own people, not to mention the masses at large, for sheer economic (oil) or strategic (communist containment) reasons has not helped the United States gain sympathy. The continuing bombing of Iraq, the suffering of the people, and the survival of Saddam's rule have transformed the dictator into a "victim" and "hero" of the Arab and Muslim masses. Furthermore, the West's sudden "openings" to its "archenemies" such as the Iranian mullahs, the terrorist-inspiring leaders of Syria and Libya, and the Sudanese ethnic-warwaging government are perceived in the region as signs of weakness. The West in general and the United States in particular have been judged to be incapable of "punishing" or removing the anti-American leaders of those countries.
All the factors identified above have affected events in the region as well as the mood of its various people. But they cannot completely account for the many rebounds and setbacks that have resulted from continual efforts made to establish peace between Arabs and Israelis and ensure stability in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. It seems to me that there is a deeper cause that can be traced to the circumstances of history: During the past half-century, policymakers were engaged mainly in crisis management and spent little time trying to find long-range solutions. Most efforts and initiatives were concentrated on the immediate political aspects of problems such as concluding armistices between warring parties, alleviating the plight of the refugees, and organizing peacekeeping forces. Scarce attention was paid to the roots of the problem. Indeed, the Arab-Israeli conflict extends far beyond the states bordering Israel. It concerns Jews and Muslims throughout the world. It is not only a dispute about territory, as suggested by the slogan "land for peace"; it reflects deep historical and theological undercurrents that are as important as (if not more so than) present political circumstances. Extremists on both sides are trying to exploit this aspect of the conflict in order to turn it into a holy war and seize power in their own countries.
The conflict represents a clash between two powerful claims. Both Muslims and Jews consider Palestine as a singular gift bestowed on them by God. Moreover, just as Jews believe the biblical assertion that they are "the chosen people," Muslims believe that Islam is the most recent and "final" message of Allah and that Muhammad (the "seal") is the ultimate prophet. Therefore, they believe that Islam supersedes all other religions and that its flag should hold sway over the planet. Moreover, the Islamic belief in primacy provided the doctrinal justification for "jihad" (holy war) that allowed the Arabs to conquer so many lands. The "interruption" of Jihad, therefore, is only provisional, and the division of the world into the "House of Islam" and the "House of War" must sooner or later be ended and the world must be united under the rule of Islam. Non-Muslim communities can exist inside the "House of Islam" but not as sovereign entities. Although it is not actively pursued, this interpretation of the Koran commandments, which was confirmed approximately eight centuries ago by many "ulemas" and doctors of law, is still valid in theory. According to it, Israel must disappear.For Jews, on the other hand, Palestine is "the promised land." Minority orthodox religious groups that play an important role in the Knesset assert that the Torah prohibits the transfer of any portion of the land to foreign rule.
Consequently, the Arab-Israeli conflict can be construed as the overarching antagonism between two opposed religious views exacerbated by contemporary circumstances and local and international political factors. In addition to the theological dimension, deeply rooted psychological feelings have come into play. The acquisition of dignity and the avoidance of shame and humiliation that stem from old tribal traditions provide another key to understanding a large part of the mind-sets of the region. In short, the differences in the mind-sets of the people of the region will continue to exert a great influence on any peace settlement negotiated among them.
Although living side by side, Israelis, Arabs, and other people of the region are not contemporaries. One can say that the Israelis (for the most part) live in the twentieth century whereas the others are bogged down in different stages of the past. Moreover, Arab officials, contrary to their Israeli counterparts, need not worry about being rejected by voters for their performance. They are sure to win more than 99 percent of the vote. Only death, natural or contrived, can remove them from office. As an eminent columnist put it recently, "The Arabs and Jews need a peace process. But the Arab world needs a modernization process even more. " 2 What makes things worse in the Muslim world is that the fundamentalist or tradition~ist attack on modernizers is launched from a platform that is already orthodox, for the interpretations of the religion that are accorded validity today are the same as those that have been stultified since the twelfth century. Consequently, modernization (meaning in fact a change in the mind-sets of people) constitutes a basic condition for peace and stability in the region. Many Arab intellectuals are aware of this. For example, Professor Edward Said, an American Palestinian who was a member of the National Palestinian Council until recently, commented as long as five years ago that "After the hoopla celebrating 'the first step toward a Palestinian state,' we should remind ourselves that much more important than simply having a state is the kind of state it is. The history of the postcolonial world is disfigured by one-party tyrannies, rapacious oligarchies, social dislocation caused by Western 'investments' and large-scale pauperization brought about by famine, civil war, or outright robbery. Nationalism, like religious fundamentalism, can never be the 'answer' to the problem of new secular societies. " 3
Glossing over the historical and theological undercurrents of problems cannot lead to a lasting solution of contemporary conflicts. Accordingly it may prove useful to create inside the State Department or the National Security Council an office whose main task would be to evaluate and determine the role played by cultural and psychological factors in shaping the perception of political problems and then try to devise solutions that take into account the multifaceted nature of problems that prevail in different regions of the world. Indeed, it appears that sometimes foreign policymakers craft decisions that boomerang because they do not take into account the mind-set of the people and other realities of a country. Take, for example, what I call, for want of a better expression, the myth of mad dictators spurred on by "irrational rage." Khomeini, for instance, knew perfectly well what he was doing when he held the American diplomats hostage; he used that egregious incident to thwart his adversaries at a critical juncture in his "revolution." A case can also be made for the assertion that Saddam did not act 'irrationally'' in the judgment of the people of Mesopotamia: Kuwait is a British colonial construct, not a separate state. Furthermore, many consider his ruthlessness and killings no different from those of other dictators in the region. Neither the Hama slaughter in Syria nor the mass executions by the Iranian "Islamic judges" are exceptions.
As one looks at certain American foreign policy options formulated by foreign policy practitioners, one wonders whether they have let themselves be entranced by what might be called a Western movie mind-set that pits "bad guys" against "good guys. " In many cases, it seems, the experts appear to be exclusively interested in identifying the "villain" of the story. For instance, until the recent elections in Israel, every scenario proposed for resuming the stalled peace process began with convincing Netanyahu to set aside his unwillingness to do business with Arafat a proposal based on the perception of most experts that the Israeli prime minister's "obstinacy" was the primary roadblock to progress. Similarly, most Iraqi specialists say that the problem is Saddam Hussein who refuses to yield an inch even in the face of the almost daily American bombings of Iraqi military facilities. The same experts also contend that the people of Iraq should be told unequivocally that Saddam and his inner circle constitute the principal obstacle to the normalization of relations between Iraq and the West. How is it possible for the experts not to see that the 1991 war and Sad-dam's survival have transformed him into a hero in the eyes of a majority of Iraqis and other Arabs? How can they not see that the sufferings of the Iraqi people resulting from eight years of sanctions and bombings have only increased their support for Saddam Hussein?
Even more curious is the manner in which some of the "villains" have been redeemed in foreign policy circles. For example, President Clinton paid a visit to President Assad of Syria who was on the State Department's list of terrorist protectors; Arafat moved from the head of a 'terrorist" organization to the chairmanship of the "Palestinian Authority" and found the door of the White House open to him; some Iranian fundamentalist mullahs who trampled the American flag are now labeled as moderates; and so on. In fact there are no real about-faces in American foreign policy; instead, only the "personalization" of situations gives the impression of a change of 180 degrees. Indeed, because it reduces problems and issues to a stage at which they appear to be relative to one another, the harmful tendency to overemphasize persons must be abandoned for the sake of a sound foreign policy.
The real moment of truth is approaching in the peace process. In Oslo the negotiators postponed the most difficult issues such as Jerusalem, the refugees, and the drawing of final borders. In Wye those issues were swept under the rug. Now they are resurfacing. Even though Netanyahu has gone, there still remains the formidable chasm that separates the Israeli consensus from Palestinian demands.The Palestinians have shrewdly prepared for the final stages of the peace process by lobbying the Europeans to revive the first 1947 UN resolution on the position of Palestine. Undoubtedly the NATO requirement that all refugees return to Kosovo as well as the acclaimed and well-publicized indemnification of all Holocaust victims will strengthen their stance on the issue of the 1948 refugees. Despite his unchallenged authoritarian ways, Arafat and his aides are being pressured by their own people who accuse them of presiding over what some local leaders call the Palestinian capitulation. On the other hand, the new Israeli government, like all Israeli governments, is bound by the security needs of Israel and restrained by its narrow majority in the Knesset.
As negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians draw close to the final stage, one should not expect rapid and satisfactory results. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to expect that recriminations will sooner or later transcend any accord between leaders. Even the signing of a treaty and a new ceremony at the White House will not bring stability to the region. One should expect bitter reactions inside lsrael and the Palestinian Authority (or newly born state). The turmoil will almost certainly spill into neighboring countries. Even if Arab governments keep cool, a number of Arab factions, Palestinian and non-Palestinian as well as others, will challenge the validity of the accords signed by Arafat. Terrorist actions will probably multiply. Tangible symbols of American interests may become targets of discontented groups.
Unfortunately, the natural tendency of diplomats and negotiators to invite immediate media coverage of initial results predisposes them to overlook the immediate necessity of trying to resolve other aspects of "unfinished" business, practically ensuring that any "final" agreement between Israelis and Palestinians will not reflect a consideration of the roots of the conflict or contain references to long-term goals. A Palestinian state will be proclaimed, recognized immediately by almost all the members of the United Nations, and admitted to the world organization, which will entitle it to its own desk in the General Assembly Hall and a seat in the Arab Group and in the Group of 77. Not only Palestinian-Israeli relations but also other problems of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf such as fundamentalist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will fester and continue to fuel heated debates in the Security Council if not actual confrontations in the region. It is true that there are no miraculous formulas for peace. It is equally true that most conflicts fade away in the long run because of sheer exhaustion. But in view of the dangers involved as well as the sufferings of the people, sustained efforts should continue to be made to avoid further turmoil and bloody clashes. It is worth repeating what contributors to this publication have underlined time and again, including the following observation; A 'comprehensive approach that takes into account both the immediate and the long-term future will be necessary to avoid producing a fragile peace that will remain vulnerable to the mercy of adventurist countries, groups, and individuals." 4
Notes1. Abe Rosenthal, 100 Brave Arabs," The New York Times, May 7,1999.
2. Thomas Friedman, "Fathers and Sons," The New York Times, February 12, 1999
3. Edward Said, "Second Thoughts on Arafat's Deal," Harpers' Magazine, January 1994.
4. American Foreign Policy. December 1998.
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Fereydoun Hoveyda, former ambassador of Iran to the United Nations, is a senior fellow of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, serves on its Board of Trastees, and is chair of its project on the Middle East.
Ambassador Hoveyda is the author of a number of books, including The Broken Crescent, The "Threat of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism, a National Committee on American Foreign Policy Study, which was published in July 1998.
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