With the war and the occupation of Paris by the Germans in 1940, he moved to Vichy, the provisional capital of Maréchal Petain’s regime. Then he became ambassador to Turkey and remained in Ankara until 1944. I really met him as a young adult when I joined the Foreign Ministry in 1945. There I could see first hand what sort of a man he was, especially when he became Foreign Minister. He suffered from the intrigues of foreign powers as they bribed politicians and journalists and often recollected Reza Shah’s inflexibility about patriotism. Contacts with foreigners outside formal duties of one’s job were strictly forbidden. Corruption was severely punished. With the blessings of Reza Shah and by ways of his Italian connections, in spite of strong British opposition, Sepahbody had managed to create the first modern Iranian Navy. A feat Reza Shah had highly valued.

As a student in Beirut before and during World War II, I carried quite ambivalent feelings about the former Shah. As many fellow students, I admired him for his staunch patriotism and nationalism. Indeed, he had put an end in the early thirties to the power of feudal landowners and tribal chiefs, restored the authority of the central government, created modern institutions such as a justice department, the police, hospitals, Tehran’s University, modern schools, railroads, etc. He had liberated women from the chador and suppressed clerical influence in government. But he rapidly forgot his democratic pledges and turned into an autocrat if not a dictator. He had eliminated some of his most able ministers and forced landowners to sell him at bargain prices some of their best lands. To balance the traditional influences of Britain and Russia, he turned first towards the French and later the Germans. Many of the students he had sent abroad to study somehow resented that attitude.

The students were still ambivalent. On the one hand they were not overly distressed to see an autocrat fall, on the other, they felt ashamed to see their homeland occupied by foreign armies. When I returned to Iran in 1944, I was myself abashed at the poverty and the backwardness I witnessed. A once booming economy was in shambles; the landowners and the tribal chieftains had regained their power; modernization had totally stopped; the country had reverted to the Middle Ages. Some who had rejoiced at the Allies’ 1941 action, now bitterly regretted Reza Shah’s deposition… His forced abdication turned the clock back. It seemed difficult to understand why he had not heeded the Allies warnings in June and July 1941.

One day, I asked Anoshiravan Sepahbody about it. The story he told me amazed me. He was Iran’s ambassador in Ankara from 1940 to 1944. In early July 1941, Ismet Inonu, then Turkey’s President had urgently called him and divulged that the British ambassador had mentioned the question of Iran and the indifference of Tehran concerning the Allies warnings about the Germans technicians in Iran. Inonu said to my uncle that in his opinion, the Allies were dead serious and that he, as a friend of Iran, would advise to oust the Germans forthwith and allow the use of the Trans-Iranian by the British and Russians. My uncle replied that the Allies could use the Dardanelles. Ismet Inonu's answer was simple: "Turkey’s declaration of neutrality had been formally accepted by the Allies since the beginning of World War II in 1939; moreover, German soldiers had by now almost reached the Black sea shores."

My uncle had immediately informed Tehran about Inonu’s confidential views, but had received no answer to his report. He always had a high opinion of Reza Shah’s political sharpness and the great attention he generally paid to his reports. In addition a few years back, it was upon his recommendation that Mussolini's intended alliance with Iran was cast aside by the Shah. "Italy is too far and their forces will be incapable to help us in case of conflict" Sepahbody had said to the Shah. One can imagine the consequences for Iran had Shah signed it. Thus, it was surprising that Reza Shah did not heed Inonu’s advice. Why did he not respond to the Allies or at least discuss with them the ways to control the activities of German experts working for the Iranian government? It was crystal clear that the Allies were determined to use the Trans-Iranian railway. Instead of working a compromise, Iran had apparently hardened its position! As a result the Shah had been forced out. My uncle was at a loss about what had happened inside the Iranian government. When he returned from Turkey in 1944, he inquired about the confidential report he had sent in July 1941. Usually such reports were immediately submitted to the Shah by the foreign minister and /or the Prime Minister. In the summer of 1941, the post of foreign minister was vacant and the Prime Minister, Ali Mansour supervised the ministry. What had happened to the Inonu report? Nobody remembered. Mansour himself professed that he had no recollections about ever having seen it.

I have always separated facts from conspiracy theories. Years later, in 1970, I remembered the incident. I was at the time under-secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I asked the head of the section of "classified documents" of the archives department to look into the files. After a prolonged search he found my uncle’s urgent and confidential report. It had not been shown to Reza Shah. The Prime Minister had initialed it without comments and it had been automatically sent to the archives! Had Reza Shah seen the report, perhaps Iran's invasion could have been avoided. I was amazed and mulled over the reasons that have prompted the then PM to disregard it. We Iranians are adepts of conspiracy theories. I remembered that in the 30's Mansour was minister of roads and communications. The Shah had ordered his arrest on corruption charges but after a lengthy ordeal he had been acquitted. Had he acted on revenge or was he prompted by internal and external pressure of those who wanted to get rid of Reza Shah? Indeed the Shah had antagonized both the clergy, the feudal landowners and heads of tribes; he also had turned against the British who had helped him in the mid-twenties to become Shah; could it be that the Prime minister was an agent of the British? As for the Russians, Reza Shah had dismantled the nascent Iranian communist party and thrown in jail its 53 leaders… Who knows? Personally, I would rather think that Mansour who was rushed by precipitating events simply overlooked the report through negligence.

I will now recall another instance of my uncle's patriotic spirit. With the end of World War II, the Americans wanted to sell to Iran what they called the "surplus" of their occupation army. This consisted in used tents, ordinary tools, used trucks and cars (mainly jeeps,) used blankets and other junk. They asked something around a hundred million dollars or more. Iran was then a poor country lacking hard international currency. As a member of the cabinet, Sepahbody opposed the deal. A pro-American minister reported his attitude to the American ambassador in Tehran. In those days, elated by their victory over Germany and Japan, by their atomic bomb and by the growth of their economy and their military power, Americans had become somehow arrogant, twisted arms,  and could not stand opposition to their demands.

Infuriated, the American ambassador in Tehran asked to see Sepahbody. I remember very well the incident. It was a Friday morning, the Iranian weekly recess. The personal assistant to my uncle called from the Ministry about the American envoy's request for an audience. My uncle asked if it was about an urgent matter. Half an hour later the assistant called back and informed the Minister that it was about the selling of the "surplus." This obviously was not an urgent political matter. Moreover the next cabinet meeting was scheduled for the coming Wednesday. My uncle told his assistant to arrange for a meeting at the Foreign Ministry on Saturday, first day of the Iranian week. The assistant called again to say that the ambassador wanted an immediate meeting and was ready to come to the Minister’s private residence. That upset my uncle. I remember his words: "We’re not a colony but an independent country. No foreign ambassador can order my schedule… Tell him that I will not see him today and that's   final." The American ambassador complained to Washington, the Shah and the Prime minister. Sepahbody was forced to resign but the incident  however ended also in the recall of U.S. ambassador by Washington.

A few months later, in early 1946, the astute Qavam-Saltaneh became Prime Minister once again amid a crisis created by the Russian-inspired secession of Azerbaijan. He wanted Sepahbody as Foreign Minister. But the Shah reminded him about the opposition of the Americans. Finally, Qavam kept the foreign ministry for himself and named Sepahbody as Minister of Justice (attorney general) in order to accommodate the Shah and mark at the same time his independence towards the Americans which was essential to him in order to overcome Stalin’s suspicions. Later on that year, Sepahbody was appointed as head of our delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. By the end of 1946 he became for the third time in his career ambassador to France.